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horne in France, but whether men and women are at ease with this
'French' God" (225).
Such criticisms notwithstancling, God in France is as rewarcling
to read as it is important for the furtherance of the contemporary
debate. It is the perfect collection to include in a graduate seminar on
phenomenology or continental philosophy of religion and should be
carefully read by anyone working in continental philosophy who is not
readily familiar with "new" phenomenology. Additionally, because it
pairs thinkers who reside at the center of American continental interest
(e.g., Derrida, Levinas, and Marion) with thinkers who have not yet
received as much attention (e.g., Henry, Lacoste, and Girard), the book
invites us to rethink our own preferences, practices, and possibly even
prejudices. In short, by serving to invite further conversation and
challenge current perspectives, the book is exemplary.
J. Aaron Simmons
Vanderbilt Universiry
Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen
Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2004), xvii+642 pages.
Paul Ricoeur's Memory, History, Forgetting (La memoire, l'histoire, l'oubli [Seuil:
Paris, 2000]), dedicated to the memory of Simone Ricoeur, addresses
the fundamental question of the representation of the past by
examining the reciprocal relationship between remembering and
forgetting. The prevailing issue of the treatise is the possibility of the
past's being made present again. Following Vladimir Jankelevitch,
Ricoeur presents the "mysterious and profoundly obscure fact of having
been" as the human being's "viaticum for all eternity." As is befitting
for a treatise on the philosophy of history, the content of the book is
preceded by a black-and-white photograph of a baroque sculpture
from the Wiblingen Monastery in Ulm representing the dual figure of
history. (In the French edition this full-color photograph is on the
front cover). I<ronos (Chronos), an old man, represents a past that
cannot be recuperated. History, a young man, possesses the instruments
for mastering time: a notebook, ink, and a feather; the trappings of a
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philosophy of history. The word historia means, literally, "inquiry, factual
account." For the Greeks it was an inquiry into the events of the very
recent past by getting the stories of eye-witnesses and participants.
Ricoeur situates his philosophy of history in-between the mastery of
memory and the force of forgetting.
As indicated in the title, the book has a threefold structure
determined by the three key words: memory, history, and forgetting.
Each of the three parts is divided into three chapters. On top of this
triadic structure, Ricoeur provides the reader with a short reading
guideline (note d'orientation) at the beginning of each part and chapter in
a manner of "negotiaring with the reader's patience" (xvü).
Continuing the project that he previously developed in Time
andNallative (representation as part of a philosophy of time describing
human existence as historical) and Oneselfas Another (human being is
l'homme capable, as capable of talking, narraring, acring, and makinghim/
herself responsible), Ricoeur is adcling to his philosophical anthropology
avision of a human being as one who is capable of making memory
and making history: Memo1YJ Histo1YJ Forgetting is a "prolongation of
[the] uninterrupted conversation" (xv) on memory and history by
"returning to a lacuna in the problematic oE Time andNallative and in
Oneself as Another, where temporal experience and the narrative
operation are directly placed in contact, at the price ofan impasse with
respect to memory and, worse yet, of an impasse with respect to
forgetting, the median levels between time and narrative" (xv).
The first part "On Memory and Recollection,"('De la memoire
et de la reminiscence,'') is a phenomenological approach to memory
and mnemonic phenomena. Ricoeur addresses here the question of
howa memory in the present can be of something absent, the paste In
the spirit of Husserlianphenomenolo~Ricoeur investigates two issues:
'Vi whatare there memories?" and "Whose memoryis it?" (3). Following
the Husserlian distinction between "the noesis of remembering and
the noema of memories" (22), Ricoeur offers his phenomenological
sketch of memo~ linking the preverbal or lived experience (Husserl's
Erlebnis) with phenomenological hermeneutics (which Ricoeur calls
"phenomenology on the path of interpretation" [24]). Ricoeur heavily
relays on Husserl's distinction between "retention or primary memory
and reproduction or secondary memory" (31). In Ricouer's
interpretation of Husserl's "Phenomenology of the Consciousness
of Internal Time:' the famous epoche, which, for Husserl, results in
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bracketing objective time "does not begin by laying bare a pure flow;
but rather a temporal experience (Erfahrun~ that has an object-oriented
side in memory" (31). By addressing the issue of temporal duration,
Ricoeur makes meaningful a distinction between "immediate memory
or retention and secondary memory (recollection) or reproduction"
(32). Since the object of intention endures temporally, what is being
retained is immediately altered by the "ever new now." This
"modification" signifies that "to endure is to remain the same" (35).
Ricoeur quotes Husserl to stress that "a new now is always entering on
the scene, the now changes into a past; and as it does so the whole
running-off continuity of pasts belonging to the preceding points
moves 'downwards' uniformly into the depths of the past" (34).
Criticizing Husserl's presuppositions in his phenomenology of time
(which was supposed to be suppositionless and open solely to the
"things themselves''), Ricoeur points that epoche "under the guise of
objectification, strikes worldliness" (36; see also Ricoeur's detailed
analyses of Husserl as a witness to the tradition of inwardness, 109-
120).
The second part, "History, Epistemology" ("Histoire,
Epistemologie''), examines the nature and truth of historical knowledge.
History-writing is, to Ricoeur, like Plato's pharmakon (a term referring
to a drugwhich can be either poison or medicine). It therefore contains
implicit within it the question of an epistemological inquiry into the
historical sciences to answer whether it is a remedy or a poison, which
can happen only "on the reflective plane of the critical philosophy of
history" (139). Ricoeur's detailed investigation of representation
understood as "standing for" (representance) (236) leads him to discern
"historical discoursers] capacity for representing the past" (237). This
newly invented word, la representance, names the ability of the historian
to render a credible equivalent (Darstellun~ of the paste By examining
the relationship between representation and narration, Ricoeur discovers
that "the narrative form as such interposes its complexity and its opacity
on... the referential impulse of the historical narrative. The narrative
structure tends to form a circle with itself and to exclude as outside
the text, as an illegitimate extralinguistic pre~upposition, the referential
moment of the narration" (237). Ricoeur questions the possibility of
writing a history of memory by efficiently breaking up a dependence
on memory. "The beginning of the historian's scripturality is
undiscoverable" (139). By the "taking of a distance which consists in
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the recourse to the exteriorityof the arcbival trace" (139), writing bistory
is an irreducible course of reconstruction in order to "represent the
past faithfully" (229) as an instrument for seeking truth as a faithful
testimony.
The third part ''The Historical Condition" ("La Condition
bistorique"), culminates in a meditation on the necessity of forgetting
as a condition for the possibility of remembering, "framed within a
hermeneutics of the bistorical condition of the human beings that we
are" (xvi). Ricoeurwonders whetherwe can speak of a 'happy' forgetting
in parallel to 'happy' memory. In bis indecisiveness he opens up a
possibility for "an eschatology of forgetting" (501). Forgetting is linked
to memory and faithfulness to the past, while pardoning to culpability
and reconciliation with the paste A happy forgetting "can only arrange
itself under the optative mood of happy memory" (505). In bis
phenomenology of forgetting, Ricoeur pleads for "carefree memory
on the horizon of concerned.memory, the soul common to memory
that forgets and does not forget" (505).
Ricoeur's treatment of religious themes provides the basis
for an important subject of a critical inquiry in order to establish some
rules for treating religious and theological problems within philosophy.
Well known and widely commented upon is the example from Oneself
as Another, where Ricoeur excludes from the book publication bis two
final Gifford Lectures on the hermeneutics of selfhood ''The Self in
the Mirror of Scripture;' and ''The Mandated Self" to avoid criticism
of mixing two separate discourses, which have their own
presuppositions and criteria. As Ricoeur says: "I prefer the risk of
schizophrenia to the bad faith of a pseudo-argument" (Charles Reagan,
Paul Ricoeur: His Lift and Work [Cbicago: University of Cbicago Press,
1996], 125-26). In Memo1YJ Histo1YJ Forgetting, however, Ricoeur publishes
an extensive Epilogue, "Difficult Forgiveness" ("Lepardon difftcile/' 457-
506), wbich introduces the subject of forgiveness to an "eschatology
of memory." Tbis Epilogue marks a revolution in the relationsbip
between philosopbical and religious thinking by complementing the
task of memory and bistoriography by the religiously saturated issue
of forgiveness. "Forgiveness-if it has asense, and if it exists-
constitutes the hOl1zon common to memory, bistory, and forgetting.
Always in retreat, this horizon slips away from any grasp. It makes
forgiving difficult: not easy but not impossible" (457). As "capable
beings," we are somehow paralyzed in our ability to act by the
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overwhelming power of fault. On the other hand, we are paralyzed by
the mystery of feeling this fault being lifted, wbich we experience as
forgiveness. For Ricoeur, "this double enigma runs diagonally through
that of the representation of the past, once the effects of the fault and
those of forgiveness have traversed all the consecutive operations of
memory and of bistory and have placed a distincrive mark on forgetting"
(457). Forgiveness, by constituting the joint horizon for memo!)T, bisto!)T,
and forgetting, "places a seal of incompleteness on the entire enterprise"
(457), but also casts the new light on the difficult subject ofreconciliarion
in history. Ricoeur prepares the ground for an eschatological
representation of the past thus avoiding an apocalyptic tone in bis
philosophical hermeneutics. ''What is at stake is the projection of a
sort of eschatology of memory and, in its wake, of bistory and of
forgetting" (459). Ricoeur emphasizes the link between memory and
narrative identity: memory is often falsified through the detour of
narration, "slipping backinto the traps amnesty-amnesia" (505), wbich
constitutes ars oblivionis (art of forgetting). The selective side of story-
telling creates a problem for bistorical truth. With regard to forgiveness,
Ricoeur speaks of the strategy of elusion and evasion, wbich is carefully
worked out to protect the self against the return of unbearable
memories. Not always a felicitous human facul~forgiveness is therefore
not only an ability and a burdensome task. Rather, in bis analysis of
the faculty of forgiveness, Ricoeur pushes "the odyssey of forgiveness
to the center of selfhood" (489). Forgiveness is the vertical dimension
of "ily a Jepardon;' wbich emphasizes the significant asymmetry between
the power to forgive and the power to promise (horizontal correlation).
For Ricoeur, "forgiveness has the effect of dissociating the debt from
its burden of guilt and in a sense of laying bare the phenomenon of
the debt, as the dependence on a received heritage ... it should release
the agent from bis ace' (489). Tbis essential possibility of separating
the agent from bis or her action (hate the sin and love the sinner)
should create a culture of forgiveness. The arrival of forgiveness is
beyond human power. The offer of forgiveness is free and can not be
taken for granted: it restores the human being to the capacity of acting
and action to the capacity of continuing: the unbinding of the agent
from his or her act marks "the inscription, in the field of horizontal
disparity between power and act, of the vertical disparity between the
great height of forgiveness and the abyss of guilt. The guilty person,
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rendered capable of beginning again: this would be the figure of
unbincling that commands all the others" (490).
Ricoeur bimself explains that bis book is entirely closed and
concluded before the epilogue itself Adcling the epilogue on forgiveness
as a personal act, wbich happens from person to person, and does not
concern juridical institutions, was for Ricoeur a matter of intellectual
honest:)T. What holds the book together is the perspective of an appeased
memory associated with forgiveness: the recognition of the past
remembered without anger and prejudices. By emphasizing the fact
that the relation between memory; bistory and forgetting is closed upon
itself prior to the epilogue, Ricoeur opens up the question of a
hermeneutic reading of bis own work. As a philosopher who insisted
that existence itself is essentially hermeneutic he could hardly avoid
endorsing the ideal of an ever-developing interpretation of bimself:
Ricoeur's is a truly polysemic voice, sacrificing neither truth nor variety.
His voice has been true to the confused medleyof voices that constitutes
the tradition that we are.
Ricoeur's avowal that he cleanly avoided the admixture of
philosophy and theology is at variance with the textual record of bis
Memory) History) Forgetting. This however is not amistake. Self-
interpretation and textual record will always vary. This infinite variance
is an invitation to an infinite task of self-interpretation. Brilliantly and
eloquently moving between Aristotle, Sartre, Plato, Bergson, Nietzsche,
Freud, Husserl, and Heidegger, while conclucling with the Song of
Songs's "Love is as strong as death" (506), Ricoeur invites us to a never
encling dialogue, leacling us on the path "from memories to reflective
memory, passingbyway of recollection" (4). However methodologically
rigorous Ricoeur is in separatingphilosophy from theology, bis Christian
facticity nonetheless determines the discourse. This is inevitable, given
our hermeneutic belonging to tradition. Ricoeur philosophizes as a
Protestant Christian, because he must pbilosopbize as Protestant
Christian. He has no recourse to another voice. This voice cannot be
denied or ignored. With bis distinctive voice Ricoeur lets other voices
come to expression in an "unstable equilibrium."
An essential incompleteness is the horizon of writing bistor~
In Ricoeur's words:
Under histo'YJ memory andforgetting.
Under memory andforgettingy lift.
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But writing a life is another story.
Incompletion. (506)
This incompletion, the rececling of horizons, might open up a horizon
of religious transcendence. Tbis possibility of interpretation cannot
be denied and should not be understood as a flight into the unknown
or a dream for completeness, since Ricoeur placed bis whole enterprise
"from the start under the banner of the merciless critique directed
against the hubris of total reflection" (413) In this sense, the facticity
of our being is the provision (viaticum) for the journey of life and as
such is also the provision for the passage out of this mode of existence
into the totally unknown.
And'i!i Wiercinski
International Institute for Hermeneutics
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